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TIPPING THE SCALES AGAINST INSIDER
TRADING: ADOPTING A PRESUMPTION OF
PERSONAL BENEFIT TO CLARIFY DIRKS
RonaldJ.Colombo*
In this Article, ProfessorColombo anticipates the Supreme Court's
recent 8-0 decision in Salman v. United States (2016).
The appropriate standard to assess tipper-tippee liability for
insider trading has been unsettled ever since the Court last spoke
on the issue, in Dirks v. SEC (1983). This is due to Dirks's unclear
language, which appeared to articulate an unworkable standard
predicatedupon "personalbenefit." The lower courts have struggled to
define this concept.
The Ninth Circuit adopted an approach in which the personal
benefit was essentially presumed, so long as the tips in question were
made to a friend or relative. The Second Circuit, conversely, demanded
that some tangible, materialquid-pro-quo be demonstrated.
Professor Colombo argues the optimal approachforward is one
that largely dispenses of the personal benefit test. Diving deep into the
facts of Dirks, ProfessorColombo notes that the tipper in the case (who
was exonerated by the Court) was actually a whistleblower. As such,
Dirks can be read as holding that, absent evidence of good faith
whistleblowing activity, unauthorized tipping is presumptively done for
personalbenefit and, consequently, unlawful.
The Supreme Court decision in Salman closely follows Professor
Colombo's analysis. The Court held that a personal benefit can readily
be inferredwhen a tipper gives inside information to a "tradingrelative
orfriend."
* Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. I wish to thank
Steven Mare for his valuable research assistance. I also wish to thank Anthony Sabino and the
Nassau County Lawyer's Association for inviting me to present upon this subject in the summer of
2016 and for the feedback provided to me by both Professor Sabino and the Association's members
in attendance. Finally, I thank the Hofstra Law Review for affording me an opportunity to publish
upon an upcoming Supreme Court decision on relatively short notice.
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INTRODUCTION

A clich6 that maintains its usefulness is that "bad cases make bad
law."1 It covers a variety of situations, all capturing the essential truth
that peculiar fact patterns run a heightened risk of churning out illadvised precedent.2 Dirks v. SEC is one such case.'
By its own admission, the Supreme Court referred to the factual
record in Dirks as an "unusual one."4 Elsewhere, the Court opined that
the case presented "extraordinary facts" in contrast to "more typical
situation[s]."I And, it is from this case that we have the governing
standard for tipper-tippee insider trading liability.6
To make matters worse, insider trading law itself has a curious
pedigree.7 Although Congress failed to explicitly prohibit the practice in
the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Securities Act")8 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Securities Exchange Act")9 (collectively,
the "Securities Acts"), the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") has successfully persuaded the courts that Rule lOb-5's
prohibition on fraud in the purchase or sale of securities reaches insider
trading as well.' °
Not surprisingly, all of this has worked to generate considerable
confusion over the parameters of insider trading under federal law in the
United States." Ultimately, a full-blown circuit split erupted, with the
First Circuit,' 2 Second Circuit, 13 and Ninth Circuit 4 Courts of Appeals
coming to very different conclusions in interpreting Dirks.
On January 19, 2016, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
in the matter of Salman v. United States to resolve this split.' 5 The

1. Clarke v. Organ, 329 S.W.2d 670, 676 (Mo. 1959).
2. See Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1167 (Wyo. 1992) (Cardine, J., dissenting).
3. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
4. Id.at 658 n.18.
5. Id. at 662.
6. See, e.g., id.
at 663-64.
7. See Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b-5-1 and the Death of Scienter,
52 U. KAN. L. REv. 147,158 (2003) ("The Law is an Ass.").
8. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2012)).
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78pp (2012)).
10. See Swanson, supranote 7, at 158-77.
11. See generally Eric Engle, Insider Trading: Incoherent in Theory, Inefficient in Practice,

32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 37 (2007).
12.
13.
14.
15.

See United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2016).
See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447-51 (2d Cir. 2014).
See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1091-94 (9th Cir. 2015).
792 F.3d 1087, cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
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specific issue upon which the Court granted certiorari was Question 1 of
the certiorari petition, which read, in its entirety, as follows:
Does the personal benefit to the insider that is necessary to establish
insider trading under Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), require proof
of "an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least
a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature," as the
Second Circuit held in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.
2014), cert. denied,No. 15-137 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015), or is it enough that
a close family relationship, as the
the insider and the tippee shared
16
Ninth Circuit held in this case?
This will be the first time that the Supreme Court addresses the
standard for tipper-tippee liability as laid down in Dirks over thirty years
ago. 17 It affords the Court a ripe opportunity to clarify an area of the law
that has befuddled lower courts for decades. In this Article, I proffer a
proposed clarification-a standard for tipper-tippee liability that is both
more workable and normatively attractive, while also remaining faithful
to Supreme Court precedent.18 The standard is based upon a presumption
of personal benefit, rebuttable via the showing of good-faith, whistleblowing conduct.1 9
Part II of this Article provides a brief background of the U.S.
federal securities regime and its prohibition on insider trading.2" Part III
discusses the Dirks decision, and Part IV explores the three recent circuit
court decisions interpreting Dirks referenced above.2 1 Finally, in Part V,
I set forth a proposal for addressing the confusion that Dirks has
engendered and resolving the aforementioned circuit split.2"
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

As I and others have explained elsewhere, the history of federal
securities regulation is a familiar one.23 Following the stock market crash
of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression, Franklin D. Roosevelt was
elected president on a platform that, in part, called for the moral and
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Salman, 136 S. Ct. 899 (No. 15-628).
17. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662-64 (1983).
18. See infra Part V.B.
19. See infra Part V.B.
20. See infra Partl.
21. See infra Parts HI-IV.
22. See infra Part V.B.
23. See Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud,61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 65-72
(2009). Much of what follows is taken from this article.
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ethical reform of Wall Street.2 4 With the help of his vaunted "brain
trust," Roosevelt worked with Congress to federalize the regulation of
securities via the Securities Acts."
The federal approach to securities regulation was striking for its
novelty. Contrary to the prevailing approach taken by the states, the
federal Securities Acts were built around mandatory disclosure, rather
than merit regulation.26 As untruthful disclosure is arguably worse than
no disclosure at all, the Securities Acts also included several antifraud
measures aimed at bolstering the reliability of securities market
disclosures, whether mandatory or voluntary.2 7 At the forefront of these
measures, and critical to our inquiry, was section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act.28
Via section 10(b), Congress authorized the SEC to promulgate
"rules and regulations" necessary to combat manipulation and deception
in the securities markets.2 9 In the Act's own words:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, ... any manipulative or

deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the
30
protection of investors.

24. See Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold? Analyst Fraudfrom Economic and Natural
Law Perspectives, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 91, 119-20 (2007); John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics:
A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring Federal Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1036 (2001).
25. See Colombo, supra note 24, at 120-22; Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and CorporateSocial Transparency,112 HARV. L. REv. 1197, 1215, 122335 (1999).
26. See Colombo, supranote 24, at 122-23; see also Henry Klehm III, Comment, Contractual
Shifting of Defense Costs in PrivateOffering Securities Litigation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 973-76
(1988).
27. See Colombo, supra note 24, at 122; Klehm, supra note 26, at 975-76; see also Kun
Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear and
Restrained Scope of ExtraterritorialSubject-MatterJurisdiction,9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89,
93 (2003).
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); see Kent Greenfield,
The Unjustified Absence of FederalFraudProtection in the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 726
& n.50 (1997).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
30. Id-
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Eight years later-in 1942-the SEC wielded the authority bestowed
upon it under section 10(b) and promulgated Rule 1Ob-5.31
Rule 10b-5 attempts to circumscribe the widest range of conduct
subject to prohibition under section 10(b) by broadly enjoining any fraud
or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.3 2 The
text of Rule lOb-5, in its entirety, reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.33
The SEC has been aggressive in its use of Rule lOb-5 to combat
securities fraud, especially in the context of insider trading, as discussed
below.34 This has led to a string of both remarkable victories and
stinging defeats in the nation's courts-exemplified by its successes and
failures at the Supreme Court itself.35 At the heart of many of the SEC's
losses has been the fundamental principle of administrative law that "the
language of the statute must control the interpretation of the Rule."36 As
the Supreme Court has explained:
The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged
with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make
to carry into effect the
law. Rather, it is "the power to adopt regulations
37
will of Congress as expressed by the statute."

31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992); see Mary Ellen P. Dooley, An Implied Right Of
Contribution Under Rule l0b-5: An Essential Element of Attaining the Goals of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, FORDHAM L. REV., May 1993, at S185, S193. The story of Rule lOb-5 is
famously retold by one of its drafters in Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures,22 BUS.
LAw. (A.B.A.) 891, 921-23 (1967).
32. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
33. Id.
34. See infra Parts 1I.B, HI-IV; see also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the
Counterrevolutionin the FederalSecuritiesLaws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 920-45 (2003).
35. See Pritchard, supranote 34, at 920-45.
36. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
37. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (quoting Dixon v. United
States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)).
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Thus, to the apparent chagrin of the SEC on several occasions, the scope
of Rule lOb-5 "cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by
Congress under § 10(b)." 3t As such, conduct that could plausibly be read
as prohibited by Rule 1Ob-5 but not falling within the parameters of
section 10(b) is not unlawful, despite the SEC's wishes to the contrary.39
B. Insider Trading
Perhaps nowhere has the SEC been more aggressive in its crusade
against securities fraud than with regard to insider trading. n It is to that
subject that we now turn.
In its 1961 decision In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,4 the SEC, for the
first time, held exchanged-based insider trading to be a subset of federal
securities fraud.42 As per the SEC in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., the act
of willfully trading upon material, nonpublic information constitutes the
offence of insider trading, and, concomitantly, violates Rule 1Ob-5's
prohibition against securities fraud.43 This decision ushered in the
"disclose or abstain" rule: an individual in possession of material,
nonpublic information must abstain from trading upon such information
or disclose it to his or her trading party in order to avoid running afoul
of Rule lOb-5. 44
Predicated upon principles of simple fairness, the SEC's disclose or
abstain rule announced in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. enjoyed success in
the federal courts as well, including an important victory before an en
banc panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in SEC v. Texas Gulf

38. Id. at 214; see, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227, 231-35 (1980)
(rejecting the SEC's "disclose or abstain" rule because it goes beyond the prohibition of "fraud" as
circumscribed by § 10(b)).
39. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 234-35.
40. By "aggressive," I do not refer to the SEC's relative priorities but rather to its tendency to
ambitiously "push the envelope" by making arguments and bringing cases that test the limits of the
securities laws. See Lisa Rachlin, Recent Developments in the Duty Requirement Under the
Misappropriation Theory: A Critique of Cuban's Unintended Consequences, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS.
L.J. 67, 71-72, 74 (2010).
41. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
42. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of
Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1320-21 (1999). Prior to In re Cady, Roberts
& Co., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that Rule lOb-5 prohibited insider trading in the
context of a face-to-face securities transaction. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798,
800-01 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
43. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 910-13.
44. See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 1Ob-5: Chiarella's History,
Central Bank's Future,20 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 865, 871 (1995).
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Sulphur Co.45 The curtain came crashing down, however, in 1980, when
the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Chiarellav. United States.4 6
In Chiarella, the Court held that Rule 10b-5 does not support the
SEC's cherished disclose or abstain rule. 47 Adverting to the enabling
legislation upon which Rule 1Ob-5 was promulgated and invoking the
administrative law principles mentioned previously,4 8 the Court pointed
out that the text of section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
49
concerns itself with "fraud" specifically and not unfairness generally.
Although everything that is fraudulent is most likely unfair, not
everything that is unfair is simultaneously fraudulent.5 ° Consequently,
the SEC's use of Rule lOb-5 to prohibit insider trading on the basis of
material, nonpublic information-without more-fell outside the
parameters established by Congress in its enactment of section 10(b).51
The Supreme Court proceeded to explain that in order to prohibit
insider trading on the basis of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the
nondisclosure of information (on the part of the trader) must somehow
be fraudulent.52 And, the only time that silence (nondisclosure) would be
deemed fraudulent would be in situations where a duty to disclose
already existed.53 Such a duty is present when the trader is an agent
of his or her counterparty, a fiduciary of his or her counterparty, or
"a person in whom [his or her counterparty] had placed their trust
and confidence."54
Nearly twenty years later, the SEC recovered some of the ground it
lost in Chiarella,in United States v. O'Hagan.5 Although the Supreme
Court in O'Hagan did not retreat from its position that Rule 1Ob-5's
prohibition on insider trading must involve fraudulent conduct, it
dramatically widened the scope of potential defendants by adopting
the "misappropriation theory" of insider trading.56 Pursuant to the
misappropriation theory, the fraud essential to a finding of unlawful
insider trading need not be limited to one's conduct vis-d-vis his or

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

401 F.2d 833, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
445 U.S. 222, 231-35 (1980).
See id.
at 234-35.
Id.at 232-35; see supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232-35.
See id.at 232.
See id.at 232-35.
See id.at 235.
Id.
Id. at 232.
521 U.S. 642, 653, 661-62 (1997).
See id.at 652-53, 665-66.
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her trading counterparty but could be committed upon the source of
the information.57
Taken together, Chiarella and O'Hagan stand for the proposition
that the duty to disclose or abstain from trading generally only applies to
the following:
(1) [P]eople who are recognized fiduciaries ...or who are otherwise
involved in relationship[s] of trust and confidence that are breached for
personal gain (deceptive self-dealing); and (2) people who otherwise
"feign[ ] fidelity to the source of information" but then misappropriate
such information for personal gain (deceptive stealing). 8

III. DIRKS AND TIPPER-TIPPEE LIABILITY
"Tipping" refers to the act by which a "tipper" passes material,
nonpublic information along to a "tippee."59 For reasons that become
quickly identifiable, it was long understood that a prohibition on insider
trading would be of only the most limited utility without an
accompanying ban on tipping.6" Without a ban on tipping, a considerable
loophole in insider trading's circumscription would be laid bare.61 Thus,
when the Supreme Court announced its decision in Chiarella,upending
decades of the disclose or abstain rule, it was nevertheless careful to
account for the precedent against tipping.6 2 As the Court explained:
"Tippees" of corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10(b)
because they have a duty not to profit from the use of inside
information that they know is confidential and know or should know
came from a corporate insider. The tippee's obligation has been
viewed as arising from his role as63a participant after the fact in the
insider's breach of a fiduciary duty.

57.
58.

See id. at 652.
Bruce W. Klaw, Why Now Is the Time to Statutorily Ban Insider Trading Under the

Equality of Access Theory, 7 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 275, 288-89 (2016) (quoting OHagan,
521 U.S. at 655).
59. See Tippee, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); Tipper, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra.
60. See Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REv. 181, 191

(2006).
61. See id, at 205.
at 204.
62. See id.
63. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980) (citation omitted) (citing
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1974));
Comment Letter on Material, Non-Public Information from Subcommittees on Broker-Dealer
Matters and on Rule 1Ob-5, Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Corp., Banking, and Bus. Law, to Harvey L.
Pitt, Exec. Assistant to the Chairman, SEC (Oct. 15, 1973), in No. 233 BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW REPORT D-1 to D-2 (1974).
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The Supreme Court provided a more thorough exposition of its
view of tipper-tippee liability just three years later in Dirks v. SEC 64.
the Court's first, and to this day its only, major pronouncement on
tipping.6 5 Indeed, since 1983, the Court has only cited this seminal case
seven times 66 and only engaged in any substantive discussion of Dirks
67
two times.
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, the fact pattern presented
in Dirks is an odd one.68 Given the centrality of Dirks to our
examination, its salient facts should be presented in full.
Raymond Dirks was an investment analyst who specialized in
covering insurance company securities.6 9 On March 6, 1973, Ronald
Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America ("Equity
Funding") (a life insurance and mutual fund company) contacted Dirks
with material, nonpublic information. v Secrist disclosed to Dirks that
Equity Funding had "vastly overstated" its assets due to "fraudulent
corporate practices. ' 71 Secrist "urged Dirks to verify the fraud and
disclose it publicly.

72

Dirks's subsequent investigation corroborated Secrist's allegations
of fraud.73 During this time, "[n]either Dirks nor his firm owned or
traded any Equity Funding stock, but throughout his investigation he
openly discussed the information he had obtained with a number of
clients and investors., 74 Not surprisingly, some of these clients and
investors sold their holdings in Equity Funding, and, on account of this,

64. 463 U.S. 646, 665-67 (1983).
65. See id.
66. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund. Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418 (2014); Janus Capital
Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 145 n.8 (2011); United States v. O'Hagan, 521
U.S. 642, 652 (1997); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 172 (1994); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); Carpenter v. United States,
484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 311 n.21
(1985).
67. See O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 663 (acknowledging that Dirks expressly left open the question
of the misappropriation theory's validity in certain circumstances); Bateman Eichler,Hill Richards,
Inc., 472 U.S. at 311 n.21 (quoting extensively from Dirks in support of the proposition that "[a]
tippee generally has a duty to disclose or to abstain from trading on material nonpublic information
only when he knows or should know that his insider source 'has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information'-in other words, where the insider has sought to
'benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure"').
68. See supratext accompanying notes 1-5.
69. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648.
70. Id. at 648-49.
71. Id.at649.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
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the SEC brought insider trading charges against Dirks.7 5 In a hearing
before one of its own administrative law judges, the SEC found Dirks
guilty of aiding and abetting violations of the Securities Acts by virtue of
his conduct as a "tippee" who subsequently tipped others.76 Dirks sought
review in federal court, and his case ultimately landed before the
Supreme Court.77
The Supreme Court initiated its discussion by reviewing its thenrecent decision in Chiarella regarding the fundamental elements of
insider trading.78 Namely, that which makes insider trading wrongful
(and a violation of Rule lOb-5, properly understood) is, at its core, a
breach of a duty to disclose imposed by virtue of a fiduciary relationship
of "trust and confidence."79 As O'Hagan had not yet been decided, the
fiduciary relationship referred to in Dirks was that between the purchaser
and the seller of the security in question;80 post-O 'Hagan,this duty can
be found between the trader in possession of material, nonpublic
information and the source of that information.8 1
The Court proceeded to question how this breach of duty could be
shown in the context of a "typical tippee," who has no fiduciary
relationship with his or her trading counterparties.82
The SEC pressed for a rule by which tippees who knowingly
receive "non-public, material information from insiders become 'subject
to the same duty as [the] insiders."' 83 However, the Court rejected this
position, noting how it ran contrary to the Court's holding in Chiarella.4
For, once again, the Court observed, the SEC's proposed rule would
impose a duty of disclosure upon someone simply because of his or her

75. Seeid. at649-51.
76. See id. at 650-51. Given Dirks's role in exposing Equity Funding's fraud, the SEC merely
censured him. See id at 651-52.
77. See id. at 652.
78. See id. at 653-54.
79. Id. at 653-55.
80. See id. at 654-55.
81. See Nelson S. Ebaugh, Insider Trading Liability for Tippers and Tippees: A Callfor the
Consistent Application of the PersonalBenefit Test, 39 TEx. J. Bus. L. 265, 276-78, 281-87 (2003)
(discussing courts' attempts to reconcile misappropriation theory with tipper-tippee liability).
82. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655. In its discussion, the Court made clear that information
"revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the
corporation" presents an entirely different situation. See id. at n.14. Such persons are properly
deemed fiduciaries by virtue of their relationship with the corporation. Id. Consequently, when they
divulge material, nonpublic information to someone else, they are more properly viewed as tippers
themselves. Id.
83. Id. at 655-56 (alteration in original) (quoting Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17480, 21
SEC Docket 1410 n.42 (Jan. 22, 1981)).
84. Id. at 656.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss1/9

10

Colombo: Tipping the Scales Against Insider Trading: Adopting a Presumptio

2016]

TIPPING THE SCALES AGAINST NSIDER TRADING

possession of material, non-public information.85 The SEC's
justification, that the information was received from a tipper who in fact
had such a duty, was deemed unavailing.8 6 And rightly so, as fiduciary
duties are ordinarily not so contagious. Although fiduciary duties are
imposed in a variety of circumstances, merely communicating with
87
someone who is a fiduciary is not one of them.
Further, the Court questioned the policy implications of the SEC's
proposed rule. 88 Foremost among these, it threatened to inhibit the
critical work of market analysts, "which the SEC itself recognizes is
' '89
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.
Nevertheless, in line with many other courts and commentators, the
Supreme Court did acknowledge that "[t]he need for a ban on some
tippee trading is clear."9 ° The starting point for any such ban should be
the uncontroversial proposition that "[n]ot only are insiders forbidden by
their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate
information to their advantage, but they may not give such information
to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the
information for their personal gain."91 In other words, an individual
ought not be able to do indirectly what he or she is prohibited from
doing directly.92 Hearkening again back to Chiarella,the Court recalled
its previous observation that a tippee's liability "has been viewed as
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach
of a fiduciary duty."93
Now needing to expand upon its dicta in Chiarella, the Court in
Dirks proceeded to flesh out its theory of tipper-tippee liability in
detail.94 It began by reasoning that at its foundation, tipper-tippee
liability, as with all insider trading liability, must be predicated upon a
breach of a fiduciary duty.95 Within the context of Dirks's facts, and preO'Hagan, this duty would be the insider's duty to not trade upon and to

85. See id.
86. See id. at 656-58.
87. See id. at 656 n.15; see also D. Gordon Smith, The CriticalResource Theory of Fiduciary
Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1412-13, 1450-52, 1483-85 (2002) (discussing different types of
fiduciary relationships, why they exist in certain circumstances, and how courts impose them).
88. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 659; see supratext accompanying notes 59-63.
91. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
92. See id.
93. Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)); see supra text
accompanying note 63.
94. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
95. See id.
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maintain the confidentiality of, material, nonpublic information.9 6 So as
a threshold matter, absent any such breach on the part of the insider,
there can be no liability on the part of anyone to whom the insider may
have revealed material, nonpublic information.97
But, wouldn't the divulgence of material, nonpublic information on
the part of an insider always constitute a breach of his or her fiduciary
duties to the corporation? 98 Well, no. One could posit a revelation that
was duly authorized. 99 One could also posit a revelation that was made
unknowingly (such as an inadvertent slip of the tongue, or even the
discussion of information that the insider erroneously believed to be
already public).100 And, as in the case of Dirks, and to which we shall
shortly turn, one could imagine the revelation of a whistleblower. 10 '
In order to navigate this thicket of possible circumstances, the
Supreme Court formulated what has come to be known as the "personal
benefit" test.1" 2 To the Court, whether an insider's disclosure amounts to
a breach of fiduciary duty "depends in large part on the purpose of the
disclosure,""1 3 and the presence (or absence) of personal benefit sheds
light on such purpose. °4 Put differently, absent direct evidence of
intent-an unlikely convenience-courts should turn to "objective
criteria" to assess an actor's purpose.0 5 As the Court explained, the
finding of an improper purpose could turn upon "whether the insider
receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as
a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings, ' or whether "an insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend."'0 7 These findings, in
turn, could be further bolstered by certain "objective facts and
circumstances," such as "a relationship between the insider and the

96. See id.
97. Seeidat661.
98. See id. at 661-62.
99. This is what prompted the SEC's promulgation of Regulation FD. See Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716,
51716 n.7 (Aug. 24, 2000) ("As discussed in the Proposing Release, in light of the 'personal
benefit' test set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), many
have viewed issuer selective disclosures to analysts as protected from insider trading liability.").
100.

SeeDirks, 463 U.S. at 662.

101.

See infra text accompanying notes 120-23.

102.

See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of PersonalBenefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857,

859 (2015).
103. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
104.

See id.

105. Id. at663.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 664.
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recipient that suggests a quid pro quo ... or an intention to benefit the
particular recipient.""1 8
In what has come to be quite an understatement, the Court
acknowledged that "[d]etermining whether an insider personally
benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not
always be easy for courts."10 9 Nevertheless, the Court maintained "it is
essential" to have this as "a guiding principle," lest we abrogate
the concept of genuine fraud that is at the core of the Court's insider
trading jurisprudence. 110
Finally, in order for insider trading liability to attach, it must also be
shown that the tippee "knows or should know" that the tipper is
breaching his or her fiduciary duties in disclosing the information.' 1 '
This satisfies the fundamental requirement of scienter and had already
been conceded by the SEC.112 In applying its newly announced rule to
the facts before it, the Court found that the insider trading judgment
against Dirks needed to be reversed.113
Before proceeding, it must be recognized that in Dirks there are, at
a minimum, two sets of tippers and tippees: Secrist (as a tipper) and
Dirks (as a tippee), and, subsequently, Dirks (as a tipper), and Dirks's
clients (as tippees). "4 The Court analyzed these sets in reverse order.115
With regard to viewing Dirks as the tipper and his clients as
tippees, the Court indicated that this was a non-starter, as it was
"undisputed that Dirks himself was a stranger to Equity Funding, with
'
no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders."116
Nor was he an
underwriter, accountant, lawyer, consultant or anyone else working on
Equity Funding's behalf, and therefore was not in a position "that
induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or
confidence in him."' 17 Although the case was decided years before
0 'Hagan,the Court also observed that Dirks did not "misappropriate or
illegally obtain the information about Equity Funding."' 18 For all these
reasons, Dirks did not possess a fiduciary duty of his own to preserve the
confidentiality of the material, nonpublic information that came into his
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.at660.
Seeid.n.19.
Id.at667.
See id. at 649-50.
See id. at665-67.
Id.at665.
See id.
Id.at665.
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possession, and as such could not be liable as a tipper, nor serve to
establish tipper-tippee liability.119
With regard to the Secrist-Dirks transmittal of information, the
problem with the SEC's case here was the fact that Secrist, the initial
source of the material, nonpublic information in question, violated no
fiduciary duties in disclosing it.12° Nor did the employees of Equity
Funding who corroborated the information when questioned by Dirks.12 1
For, it was undisputed that Secrist and others, corroborating tippers
"received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity
Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable
information to Dirks."' 22 Indeed, as the facts "clearly indicate[d], the
tippers were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud." ' 3 And, in the
absence of a breach, ab initio, a tipping case12 4against Dirks (or anyone
else for that matter) simply could not be built.
As indicated, Dirks, decided back in 1983, was the Court's last (and
only) tipper-tippee liability case. 125 Moreover, the Court has not
substantively expounded upon its holding in Dirks since then. 126 A major
issue that has confounded the lower courts is how to apply the personal
benefit test, a subject to which we shall turn shortly. 127 Before doing
so, however, we should first address the interplay of Dirks and
O'Hagan and the idea of predicating tipper-tippee liability upon the
misappropriation theory.
With perhaps only one exception, 128 the Supreme Court decided
Dirks within the paradigm of "classical insider trading theory" as set
forth in Chiarella.129 As such, the Court's examples and reasoning
revolved around situations involving genuine corporate insiders
with fiduciary duties of trust and confidence-insiders who owe
duties to the shareholders of the very companies in which they are
trading securities.13 °
As indicated, however, O'Hagan dramatically expanded the scope
of insider trading, holding that insider trading liability extends also to

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id.
See id. at 666.
Id.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Seeid.
See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
See infra Part TV.
See supra text accompanying note 118.
See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
See id.
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those who breach a duty of trust and confidence to the source ,of the
material, nonpublic information."' This implicates situations where the
"insider" does not necessarily owe a duty to the shareholders with which
he or she is trading.132 As in the O'Hagan case itself, misappropriation
theory covers the (mis)conduct of an attorney who, learning about an
upcoming tender offer to be launched by one of his firm's clients,
proceeds to purchase securities in the target company of the upcoming
tender offer.' 33 That is, the attorney does not purchase securities in his
firm's client (to whom he owes a duty of trust and confidence) but 3in4
another company to whom he owes no duty of trust and confidence.
This would not constitute insider trading under Chiarella's classical
theory, but it does under misappropriation theory.135 For the attorney in
this example had no right to use ("misappropriate") his client's private
information (regarding the tender offer) for his own personal gain.' 3 6 In
doing so, the attorney violated his duties to his client, and 37did so in
connection (ultimately) with the purchase or sale of securities. 1
Although courts have rather uniformly agreed that misappropriation
theory can serve as the basis of tipper-tippee liability, they have had
difficulty in explaining how.'38 Most pertinent to our inquiry, the courts
have had particular difficulty in determining how to apply the Dirks
personal benefit test, if at all, to cases of tipping arising under
139
misappropriation theory.

The reason for this, according to some commentators, is that
"[m]isappropriation theory does not easily fit tippee cases."' 14 ' The SEC,
not enamored with the personal benefit test to begin with, has pushed
this argument as follows:
The SEC's argument proceeds in two steps. First, the SEC points out
that the benefit requirement is inextricably linked to determining
whether an insider has breached a duty to corporate shareholders.
Second, the SEC notes that the distinguishing feature of
131.

See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.

132.

O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.

133.
134.
135.
136.

See id.at 653.
See id at 652-53.
See id. at 652-53, 653 n.5.
See id. at 652-53.

137.
138.

See id.
See Ebaugh, supranote 81, at 281-87.

139. See id.
140. 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD
§ 6:563 (2d ed. 2012); see also 3C HAROLD S.BLUMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 19:45 (2016). But see 5C ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND

REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 12:128 (2011) ("Tippees fit easily within the ambit of
").
the misappropriation theory ....
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misappropriation theory cases is that the outsider owes no fiduciary
duty to the corporate shareholders. Put together, the SEC contends, it is
unnecessary in misappropriation cases that it show that an outsider
intended to benefit from his disclosure; since outsiders owe no duty to
corporate shareholders to begin with, applying the Dirks test to
determine if there was a breach of a duty to those same shareholders
would be nonsensical. 141
The SEC has had some success with this position, prevailing in at least
some district courts. 42 But, apparently none have explained their
reasoning in much detail. 143 As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
proclaimed when it surveyed the case law in 2003, "[n]one of these
1 44
courts... [have given] the issue more than perfunctory thought."
Indeed, upon close examination, the SEC's argument does not
appear to hold much water. It is true that, as the SEC argues, "the benefit
requirement is inextricably linked to determining whether an insider has
breached a duty," but this need not be circumscribed as a "duty to
corporate shareholders.' ' 145 For historical (indeed, chronological) reasons
already discussed, the Dirks decision was rendered within the thenprevailing (and sole) paradigm of insider trading set forth in
Chiarella.146 So, naturally, when the Court in Dirks referred to duties
and breaches of duty, it did so via references to corporate
shareholders. 47 But, after O'Hagan, in which duties of trust and
confidence, for the purposes of insider trading, were extended beyond
the confines of corporate shareholders alone, it no longer makes sense to
press the argument that "the benefit requirement is inextricably linked to
determining whether an insider has breached a duty to corporate
shareholders" as the SEC has done. 148 Indeed, a superior articulation of
the case law, and one that harmonizes rather than bifurcates the Supreme
Court's insider trading precedent, 149 would be reformulated as "the
benefit requirement is inextricably linked to determining whether an

141. BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 140, § 6:563 (quoting SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1275
(1 th Cir. 2003)).
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1275.
145. See id.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
148. See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1275-76 (emphasis added).
149. See id.("[W]e think the SEC is unduly dichotomizing the two theories of insider trading

liability.... The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that we should attempt to synthesize,
rather than polarize, insider trading law.").
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insider has breached a duty to anyone."15 Indeed, such reformulation
would comport well with all existing precedent, for even under
misappropriation theory, scienter remains an element. 15' An inadvertent
disclosure to a tippee, or one for whistleblowing purposes, as in Dirks,
by one who would otherwise be a misappropriator would not constitute
insider trading even after O'Hagan.'52 Not coincidentally, in both
situations, the presence of a personal benefit on the part of the tipper
would be lacking.' 53
In short, the personal benefit test should best be understood as
applicable to both classical and misappropriation theory insider trading
cases. There is no compelling, principled argument to apply the test
to one category of insider trading cases and not the other. For the test
goes to the tipper's motivations in disclosing the material, nonpublic
information that he or she has come to possess, and this factor
would appear relevant in both classical and misappropriation insider
trading cases. 154
IV.

THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST

In Dirks, the Supreme Court was not exactly pellucid in articulating
the personal benefit required to sustain a tipper-tippee insider trading
case.' 55 The Court suggested several "objective criteria" that could be
used to show this benefit, but the criteria do not fit together all that
well.' 56 Over the course of a few sentences, the Court identified the

at1275.
150. See id.
151. See Michael D. Monico & Jacqueline S. Jacobson, Supreme Court Turns Insider Trading
Inside Out, CHAMPION, Dec. 1997, at 12, 15.
152. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665-66 (1997).
153. See id. at 663; Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
154. Perhaps, the personal benefit controversy in misappropriation cases is largely one of
semantics. For, as one leading commentator has explained:
There can be no legitimate reason for disclosure when the original source
misappropriated the inside information. For this reason, the second part of the second
element [personal benefit] is not needed under those facts. Thus, the entire second Dirks
element in misappropriation cases should be that the original source, at the time of the
misappropriation, breached his duty to the person or entity from which he
misappropriated the inside information.
JACOBS, supra note 140, § 12:132. In other words, if one (fairly) conceptualizes misappropriation as
encompassing an improper purpose, it would be largely redundant to insist that one also
demonstrate a personal benefit in order to confirm that the disclosure of information was done in
breach of a duty. But, redundancy, unless it is a certainty in every conceivable basis, is not, I posit, a
good reason to dispense with a test that can serve an important purpose in even a small number of
situations. See infra Part V.B.
155. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64.
156. See id.
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following possible (and somewhat contradictory) factors as potentially
demonstrative of "a direct or indirect personal benefit":
" "a pecuniary gain";
* "a
reputational benefit that will translate
into
future earnings";
* "a relationship between the insider [tipper] and the recipient
[tippee] that suggest a quidpro quo";
" "an intention to benefit the particular recipient"; and
" "when an insider [tipper] makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend [tippee]. '"157
The list, above, raises a number of questions that lower courts have
struggled to answer.158 Most revolve around the fact that, ordinarily
speaking, making a "gift" is considered the opposite of pursuing
personal "pecuniary gain."15 9 This language is difficult to reconcile, and
160
the lower courts have splintered in their approach.
As mentioned earlier, in 2016, contrary interpretations of the
personal benefit test by the Second and Ninth Circuits prompted the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari to resolve the issue. 161 Later in 2016, a
First Circuit Court of Appeals decision on the subject was added to these
conflicting cases.1 62 Placed on a continuum, the Second Circuit can be
said to represent the strictest or most demanding interpretation of
personal benefit, and the Ninth Circuit the most lenient or least
demanding interpretation, with the First Circuit occupying a position
163
between the two (although closer to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation).
Let us review these cases in turn and in chronological order.
A.

United States v. Newman

In United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held, in pertinent part, that there is no breach of fiduciary duty on the
part of the tipper (and, thus, no insider trading liability), 164 unless the
tipper "is in effect selling the information to its recipient for cash,

157.
158.

See id.
See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1091-94 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v.

Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447-48, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
159.
160.
Parigian,
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093-94; Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093-94; Newman, 773 F.3d at 452; see also United States v.
824 F.3d 5, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2016).
See supratext accompanying notes 11-16.
See Parigian,824 F.3d at 15-16.
See id.; Salman, 792 F.3d at 1094; Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
773 F.3d at 450.
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reciprocal information, or other things of value for himself. 165 With
respect to the Supreme Court's language (and some of the Second
Circuit's own language) regarding the propriety of inferring a personal
benefit on the divulgence of information to a "trading relative or
friend," 166 the Second Circuit declared that "such an inference is
impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential,
and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature." 167 As if it were not being clear enough, the Second
Circuit quickly added that the only relationships able to support tippertippee liability predicated upon "gift[s]" and "friendship" would be
those "that suggest[] a quid pro quo" dynamic.168 What emerges
from Newman, therefore, is a personal benefit standard focused
heavily (arguably exclusively) on objective, material advantages
flowing or reasonably expected to flow to the tipper as a result of his or
169
her tipping.
The government-plaintiff in Newman was unable to demonstrate
such benefits, and for that reason the Second Circuit ordered defendants'
insider trading indictments to be dismissed.170 The government offered
evidence of (1) longstanding professional relationships (as business
school and, later, work colleagues) in which "career advice and
assistance" was sought and provided over a year before any of the
information in question was exchanged;17 1 and (2) the relationship of
"family friends" who "met through church and occasionally socialized
together."' 172 Viewing "the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the
Government's favor, and deferring to the jury's assessment of witness
credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence,"173 the court
concluded that the record was insufficient to sustain an insider trading
conviction. 17 4 "In short," the court said, "the bare facts in support of the
Government's theory of the case are as consistent with an inference of

165.
166.
167.

Id. (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
See id. at 452 (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Id.

168.

Id. (quoting Jiau, 734 F.3d at 153).

169.

See id.

170.
171.
172.

See id. at 452-55.
Id. at452-53.
Id. at452.

173.

Id. at 451 (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)).

174.

Id. at451,455.
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innocence as one of guilt. ' 175 Consequently, the government had failed
176
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. United States v. Salman
As indicated, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a contrary
interpretation of Dirks's personal benefit standard. 7 7 Aware of the
Newman precedent less than one year earlier, the Ninth
Circuit
78
Salman.1
v.
States
United
in
it
follow
to
declined
nevertheless
In Salman, the Ninth Circuit dutifully acknowledged that the
Supreme Court began its insider trading analysis in Dirks by declaring
"pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit" as a basis of tipper-tippee
liability. 179 But, the Ninth Circuit quickly observed the Supreme Court's
additional statement that "[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and
exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insidermakes a
gift of confidential information to a tradingrelative orfriend' (emphasis
supplied by the Ninth Circuit). 8 ° The Ninth Circuit took this latter
passage from Dirks as a separate, legitimate ground upon which an
insider trading conviction could be proven and applied it to the facts
81
in Salman.'
As in Newman, there was no clear evidence of personal enrichment
or gain flowing from the tipper's disclosure of material, nonpublic
information in Salman.182 Moreover, whereas in Newman the
government argued that such gain could be inferred from the facts, in
Salman it appears as though no such evidence was offered at all.' 83
Rather, the insider trading convictions in Salman rested squarely upon
the allegation that the tippers made their disclosures to the tippees "as a
gift of market-sensitive information"'18 4-"[s]pecifically, [the tipper]
testified that he disclosed the material nonpublic information for the
purpose of benefitting and providing for his brother [the tippee].' 85 As
the court concluded, proof that this occurred or "[p]roof that the insider
175. Id. at 455.
176. Id.
177. See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2015). Interestingly, the
Ninth Circuit decision was authored by Senior District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation. Id.at 1088 n.*.
178. Id.at 1093-94.
179. Id.at 1091-92 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983)).
180. Id.at 1092 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664).
181. See id.
182. See id.
at 1093.
183. See id.
at 1094; United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2014).
184. See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1094.
185.

Id.
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disclosed material nonpublic information with the intent to benefit a
trading relative or friend[,] is sufficient to establish the breach of
'1 86
fiduciary duty element of insider trading."
Thus, whereas the Second Circuit stressed the apparent
indispensability of some showing of tangible, reciprocal, personal gain
(whether immediate or delayed), the Ninth Circuit dispensed with this
ingredient altogether. 87 To the Ninth Circuit, as per Salman, the gifting
of information to a trading relative or friend, even if wholly gratuitous,
satisfies the personal benefit element of tipper-tippee liability set forth
in Dirks.188
C. United States v. Parigian
A middle road approach to tipper-tippee liability, albeit one that
veers toward the West Coast, has been provided by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Parigian.189 Decided in 2016, with
the benefit of both Newman and Salman to draw from, the First Circuit
announced an interpretation of Dirks that is strict in form but apparently
lenient in application.190
In Parigian,"Douglas Parigian made in excess of $200,000 trading
a
in securities" acting upon "obviously nonpublic information that 191
insider."
corporate
a
from
received
McPhail]
[Eric
buddy
golfing
Briefly, let us observe that, as in Dirks, there are two sets of tippers and
tippees here in Parigian: (1) the corporate insider (as tipper) and
McPhail (as tippee), and (2) McPhail (as tipper) and Parigian (as
tippee). 9 2 It appears to be uncontested that the corporate insider's
1 93
disclosure of information to McPhail constituted unlawful tipping.
That entails a host of important repercussions, most significantly that,
unlike the situation in Dirks, McPhail could potentially be liable were he
to (as he did in fact do) disclose this same information to someone
else. 194 For, a person receiving an unlawful tip "may also be liable.., if
186. Id. The court harmlessly skipped a step here: proof of this intent demonstrates that the tip
was made for a personal benefit, and the existence of a personal benefit motivating the disclosure of
nonpublic, material information constitutes a breach of the tipper's fiduciary duty toward the source
of that information (in a misappropriation case) or to the corporation's shareholders (in a classical
case of insider trading).
187. See id. at 1093-94.
188. Id. at 1094.
189. See 824 F.3d 5, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2016).
190. See id.
191. Id. at7.
192. See id. at 8-9.
193. See id. at 7-8.
194. See id. at 8-9.
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[he or] she... turns around and tips another person."' 9 5 In short, if the
conditions for tipper-tippee liability are met between the original source
of the material, nonpublic information (in this case, the corporate
insider) and the tippee (in this case, McPhail), tipper-tippee liability will
also attach if the conditions for such liability are met between the
original tippee turned subsequent tipper (in this case, McPhail) and the
196
person he or she tips (in this case, Parigian).
As Parigian stood on appeal before the First Circuit, questions
regarding McPhail's role as a potential tipper for purposes of insider
trading liability were not raised or not properly preserved. 197
Consequently, the First Circuit did not grapple with whether the
conditions for tipper-tippee liability would have been met were McPhail
himself to have traded upon the information he received from his
corporate-insider friend-that was assumed as given.' 98 Instead, the bulk
of the court's focus was on whether McPhail's tips to Parigian, and
Parigian's subsequent trading, gave rise to liability on the part of
Parigian. 19 9 Of most relevance to us was the court's discussion and
application of Dirks's personal benefit test.200
As a threshold matter, the court was ambivalent about whether the
personal benefit test was even applicable to a tipper-tippee insider
trading case predicated upon misappropriation.20 ' This is reflective of
the broader controversy over that question discussed earlier.20 2 The court
noted that in its precedent the First Circuit "dodged the question" by
expressing doubts over the test's applicability, while at the same time
finding that, if in fact necessary, a personal benefit to the tipper had been
established.0 3 The court in Parigiandoubled-down on this dodge: not
only did the court once again eschew a clear position on the necessity of
showing a personal benefit in a misappropriation case, but the court also
avoided taking a clear position on what constituted a personal benefit.2"
Regarding the latter (and for us, more pertinent) inquiry, the First
Circuit, quoting an earlier case that had come before it, explained that

195.
196.
197.
198.

See Coles, supranote 60, at 198.
See Parigian,824 F.3d at 8-9; Coles, supranote 60, at 198-207.
SeeParigian,824 F.3d at 12-13.
See id. at 8-9 (discussing that McPhail apparently did not trade upon the inside

information).
199.
200.
201.

See id. at 10-16.
See id. at 15-16.
See id. at 15.

202. See supra text accompanying notes 139-53.
203. See Parigian,824 F.3d at 15.
204. See id. at 15-16.
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"the mere giving of a gift to a relative or friend is a sufficient personal
benefit."2 5 The court noted, however, that the Second Circuit in
Newman "recently adopted a more discriminating definition" of personal
benefit.20 6 It also noted the Salman case, commenting that the Ninth
Circuit's approach to personal benefit "seemed to align itself more
closely" with the First Circuit's.0 7
As mentioned, the First Circuit in Parigian ultimately failed to
squarely stake out its position on personal benefit. 8 For, after
recounting its own precedent, along with that of its sister circuits, the
court ruled as follows:
How this [circuit split] will all play out, we do not venture to say
because, as a three-judge panel, we are bound to follow this circuit's
currently controlling precedent. We therefore hold that the
indictment's allegations of a friendship between McPhail and Parigian
plus an expectation that the tippees would treat McPhail to a golf
outing and assorted luxury entertainment is enough to allege a benefit
if a benefit is required.20 9
As can be seen, the First Circuit equivocates here twice: first, on the
issue of whether a personal benefit is even necessary in a
misappropriation case such as this one; 21° and, second, and perhaps less
obviously, as to whether this personal benefit must include some
211
tangible, material benefit (or promise thereof) to the tipper.
Regarding the second equivocation, note how the court first points
out that it is bound by controlling precedent-precedent previously
identified as holding that "the mere giving of a gift to a relative or friend
is a sufficient personal benefit.-212 But, in applying that precedent, the
court couples its observation of "a friendship between McPhail and
Parigian" with the additional observation that there also existed "an
expectation that the tippees would treat McPhail to a golf outing and
assorted luxury entertainment," which was "enough to allege a benefit if
2 13
a benefit is required.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id. at 15 (quoting SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 2006)).
See id. at 16.
Id.
See id. at 15-16.
Id.at 16.
Id.at 15-16.
See id.
See id.
at 15 (quoting SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 15-16.
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If one digs deeper into the opinion, one can shed some light on
what "assorted luxury entertainment" refers to. 2 14 For, earlier in its
decision, the court explained:
There is no allegation that McPhail himself engaged in trading. Rather,
the indictment posits that he solicited "getting paid back" by Parigian
and the others with wine, steak, and visits to a massage parlor. Parigian
at Grill 23." Another
assured him that "I will take you for a nice dinner
2 15
tipped trader offered McPhail a free golf outing.
So in return for material, nonpublic information that helped him
ring up $200,000 in trading gains, Parigian promised McPhail "a nice
' As the saying used to go, that and a quarter will get you a cup
dinner."216
of coffee.217 In other words, that is quite a thin reed upon which to rest a
finding of personal benefit. It drives home the point, I suggest, that what
really satisfied the personal benefit element in Parigianwas the gift of
information on the part of McPhail to a trading friend. 218 The
superfluous observation that McPhail was promised assorted luxuries
was, I posit, a mere fig leaf used to justify a finding of personal benefit
on the basis of friendship alone.2 19
V.

A REINTERPRETATION

OF DIRKS

A. Approaches to InterpretingPrecedent
As indicated, the convoluted history and evolution of insider
trading law has given rise, unsurprisingly, to a number of messy
problems. 220 This has prompted some to call for a full-scale legislative
fix-a statutory overhaul of federal insider trading law. 22 1 Although that
would certainly be welcome, there is little indication that this is going to
happen any time soon. In the meantime, the Supreme Court has a golden
opportunity, this upcoming term, to ameliorate at least one aspect of
insider trading law: the conditions under which tipper-tippee liability

214. Seeid. at9,16.
215. Id. at 9.
216. Id. at 7, 9.
217.

See eslobrown,

That and a Quarter Will Get You a Cup of Coffee, CL1CHt LIST

(May 31, 2011), http://www.clichelist.net/that-and-a-quarter-will-get-you-a-cup-of-coffee.
at Starbucks. And, not in 2016.
218.

But, not

See Parigian,824 F.3d at 7-9.

219. Id. at 15-16.
220. See supranotes 7-15 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Klaw, supra note 58, at 298.
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attach 22 and, more specifically, how the personal benefit test ought to be
applied. 223 This can be done, I suggest, by a modest reinterpretation of
Dirks, as occasioned by the Supreme Court's review of Salman.
As a threshold matter, I feel compelled to confess that I am
generally not one for unduly imaginative or creative interpretations of
the law, and what follows could be criticized as such. But, battles over
interpretative methods ordinarily focus on questions of statutory or
constitutional texts. 224 And, for good reason: how to best interpret a
given piece of legislation or constitutional provision implicates
incredibly weighty concerns ranging from the proper role of the
225
judiciary to our understanding of government power in general.
Although, there are, of course, serious debates over how best to engage
in the interpretation of judicial precedent itself,226 the interests at stake,
as important as they undoubtedly are, fall, I suggest, within a lower
order of magnitude.
Admittedly, insider trading jurisprudence is built upon a statutory
foundation: section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.22 7
However, as has been made clear, the prohibition on insider trading, and
the accompanying prohibition on tipping, is already several steps
removed from the statutory text.228 This has led some scholars to refer to
the rules circumscribing insider trading in the United States "as a species
of federal common law., 229 As such, I hope that all can concede,
whatever one's general approach to judicial interpretation, in this context
a relatively freer hand in revisiting past decisions and reasoning is more
defensible than usual.
To that end, there is a respectable approach to judicial
interpretation, endorsed by no less than Ronald Dworkin, pursuant to
which precedent can be interpreted via reference to its results more so

222. See Salman v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 899 (2016); see also Klaw, supra note 58 at 29091.
223.

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at i; see also Klaw, supra note 58, at

291.
224. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, ChoosingInterpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges
andEveryone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769, 777-81, 819-23 (2008).
225. See id. at 777-79.
226. See, e.g., Barbara K. Bucholtz, The Interpretive Projectand the Problem of Legitimacy,

11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 377, 381-84 (2005).
227. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
228. See supranotes 7-15 and accompanying text.
229. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal
Insider Trading Prohibition,52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1189, 1207 (1995).
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than its explicit reasoning.23 ° In other words, it is considered justifiable
to formulate a judicial rule from precedent that veers from the rules
articulated in the opinions themselves, so long as the rule formulated
does in fact fit the facts of the cases concerned.231 Of course, the strength
and persuasiveness of the rule will turn on much more than how well it
fits the facts. Whether the reformulated rule will or should prevail shall
require an examination of, at a minimum, the correctness of its reasoning
and normative appeal.232
In what follows, I do not believe I make a full-throttled, ambitious
use of this approach to interpreting precedent that prioritizes an
examination of what courts have done over what courts have said.
Rather, I believe that my proposed reading of Dirks can fit within more
traditional, conventional modes of case interpretation. Nevertheless, to
the extent that what follows is deemed a tad aggressive, and to the extent
that it pushes the proverbial envelope, I invoke the results-based
23 3
approach to interpretation highlighted above to buttress what I proffer.
B. InterpretingDirks as Establishinga Presumptionof
PersonalBenefit
Much of the consternation surrounding the Dirks personal benefit
test stems from its ambiguity and imprecision.2 34
The test is ambiguous in that it suggests two contradictory grounds
a personal benefit. The first ground is that of self-interest:
finding
for
* "whether the insider receives a direct or indirect
personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary
gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into
future earnings";...

230. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1087-1101 (1975); see also
Mary Massaron Ross, An Advocate's Toolbox: Techniques to Help Appellate Lawyers Evaluate
Precedentand Craft Analytically PreciseArguments, MICH. B.J., Aug. 2002, at 25, 26 (discussing
"reading precedent in terms of the result"); cf Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking Like a Lawyer: The
Heuristicsof Case Synthesis, 40 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 9 n.33 (2007) (noting that in situations where
some decisions contradict assertions made by the courts, "a lawyer must synthesize the cases by
explaining what the courts are doing, even if contradictory to ideas expressed explicitly on the pages
of some or all of the decisions").
231. See Ross, supra note 230, at 26.
232. See Dworkin, supranote 230, at 1101.
233. See infra Part V.B.
234. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1983).
235. Id. at 663.
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* "a relationship between the insider and the recipient that
suggests a quidpro quo." 236
Conversely, the second ground is that of altruism:
* "an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a
2 37
trading relative or friend";
238
* "an intention to benefit the particular recipient.,
Moving beyond the irreconcilability of these two grounds, a second
layer of difficulty arises with regard to terms like "pecuniary gain,"
"future earnings," and "quidpro quo" on the one hand, and "friend" on
the other.2 39 With regard to the former list of terms, how much gain,
what amount of earnings, and what kind of quid pro quo could be
used to justify a valuable tip? To invoke the parlance of contract law,
would mere nominal consideration suffice,24 ° or must the material
benefit flowing to the tipper be adequate consideration (something
241
of "equal" or "reasonabl[y]" proportioned value to the tip itself)?
Or, would something in-between suffice? 24 2 As for the term "friend," is
there a standard to be applied to that concept? Would Facebook
"friends" suffice? 24 3 Would mere workplace colleagues, or casual
acquaintances qualify?
Our need to resolve these and related questions could be dispensed
with if we read Dirks as creating a rebuttable presumption of personal
benefit. And, this would, I posit, represent not a far leap at all. Indeed, if
read as broadly as is reasonable, the situations giving rise to a personal
benefit in Dirks would cover a vast territory. Essentially, read broadly,
Dirks could stand for the proposition that (1) a personal benefit
presumptively exists in every situation in which someone receives
something in return, and (2) a personal benefit presumptively exists in
every situation in which someone does not receive something in return.
In other words, in almost every situation, we can presume that a personal
benefit exists.
By adopting this presumption, we would essentially be inverting
the Dirks test.244 We would be presuming that the intentional or knowing
revelation of material, nonpublic information to a tippee could ordinarily
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 664.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 663-64.

240.

See Nominal Consideration,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59 ("Consideration

that is so insignificant as to bear no relationship to the value of what is being exchanged ....
241. See Adequate Consideration,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59.
242.
243.

See Sufficient Consideration,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59.
See FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).

244.

See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662-64.
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be explained only by either self-interest or altruism.2 45 To combat a
finding of insider trading under such circumstances, all things being
equal, the defendant would bear the burden of asserting an affirmative
defense that his or her motivations were otherwise.
How could a defendant possibly mount such a defense? By
invoking the very situation that served to exonerate the defendant in
Dirks: that of the whistleblower.2 46 For, in the context of a bona fide
whistleblower, the knowing revelation of material, nonpublic
information would be motivated by neither self-interest nor the altruism
of gift-giving. Rather, it would be motivated by one's sense of civic
obligation.247 Consequently, our reformulation of Dirks as establishing a
presumption of personal benefit, rebuttable primarily in situations of
bona fide whistleblowing,2 48 furnishes us with a rule for tipper-tippee
liability that is clearer, easier to apply, and (still?) normatively
appealing, all while remaining fundamentally faithful to the Supreme
Court's precedent in Dirks. 249 With regard to the cases, which came
before this proposed rule, Salman would be upheld and Newman would
be overruled. This is because, absent any showing of whistleblowing
motivation on the part of the defendants in those cases, the presumption
of personal benefit would prevail. A fortiori, the defendants committed
insider trading when they passed along the material, nonpublic
information to a tippee.
Finally, it must also be noted that U.S. securities law is no stranger
to presumptions. The "fraud-on-the-market" presumption of reliance has
become a cornerstone of federal securities fraud litigation.25 ° Pursuant to
this presumption, investors in an efficient market are presumed to have
relied upon a defendant's fraudulent misstatements, omissions, or both,
" '
by virtue of their reliance on a security's price.25
Arguably striking even closer to home is the fact that the entire
edifice of U.S. federal securities law is built upon the assumption of
the "reasonable investor. '252 The "reasonable investor" is defined as

245. See id.
at663-64.
246. See id.
at 667.
247. On a darker note, it could be motivated by a desire for revenge. But, this too would not
constitute a personal benefit under Dirks as either traditionally interpreted or as re-interpreted here.
248. There are most likely other situations that would qualify to exonerate a defendant under
the presumption proposed, but I have admittedly not yet imagined them.
249. SeeDirks, 463 U.S. at 662-64.
250. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1190 (2013).
251. Seeid.at1192-93.
252. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Isthe Reasonable
Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 320 (2009); Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable
Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461,466-67 (2015).
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"the idealized, perfectly rational actor of neoclassical economics"
who "is presumed to operate rationally to maximize returns in the
marketplace. '253 Consequently, the argument can be made that I am not
really reinterpreting Dirks here at all, but rather simply reading it within
the broader context of U.S. securities law generally-a context within
which human behavior is already presumed to be driven by self-interest.
VI.

CONCLUSION

U.S. securities law suffers from a number of vexing difficulties, one
of which is the proper understanding and application of the Supreme
Court's personal benefit test as set forth in Dirks. With the Court's
decision to grant certiorari to revisit this issue in Salman, an opportunity
exists to clarify matters going forward. This can be done by interpreting
Dirks as giving rise to a presumption of personal benefit-rebuttable
upon a defendant's showing of good faith, whistleblowing activity. This
preserves the essential purpose of the personal benefit test: its service as
an escape from liability for those tippers who act in good faith and, for
the benefit of the market as a whole, to disclose fraud. At the same time,
the proposed solution drastically simplifies the application of the
personal benefit test, for in the vast majority of tipper-tippee cases its
presumption will not be subject to serious challenge. Finally, this
solution remains faithful not only to the outcome reached in Dirks, but to
the broader tradition of securities law, which already presumes that
securities market participants act to further their own self-interest.

253.

Lin, supranote 252, at 467.
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